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INTRODUCTION 
The office of Attorney-General in New Zealand 1s occupied by a Member of 
Parliament who is also a senior Minister in the government of the day, and acts as 
the Crown's chief legal advisor. In carrying out that role the Attorney-General 
advises Cabinet of the implications of proposed policy initiatives and explains the 
effect of judicial decisions where they are likely to impact upon matters under 
consideration by Cabinet. (1) 
In addition to the functions of an advisory nature, the Attorney-General 1s also 
responsible for the exercise of discretionary powers of prosecution under a number 
of statutes. The exercise of these statutory powers has, on occasion, caused problems 
both rn New Zealand and elsewhere with allegations of improper political 
considerations influencing decisions of the Attorney-General. 
This paper seeks to consider the extent to which Attorney-General's rn New Zealand 
have resisted the temptation to consider their political fortunes to be synonyomous 
with the "public interest" in exercising the responsibilities of their office. 
Where the Attorney-General gives into the temptation and takes into account 
partisan political considerations rn arriving at a decision, there exists a breach of 
the rule of law which in turn undermines the integrity of the legal system. While the 
concept of the rule of law lends itself to an extremely wide range of interpretations, 
it is nonetheless fundamental to the New Zealand constitution. (2) 
de Smith considered that the concept of the rule of law implied 
1) That the powers exercised by politicians and officials must have a 
legitimate foundation; they must be based on authority conferred by law. 
2) The law should conform to certain mrn1mum standards, both substantive 
and procedural. (3) 
It is central to the concept of the rule of law that " .. . like should be treated alike 
and unfair discrimination must not be sanctioned by law". (4) The Attorney-General 
must not, therefore, make decisions upon the basis of considerations other than those 
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relevant to determining the strength of the possible case against the individual and 
whether the "public interest" warrents the prosecution proceeding. 
This paper will outline the historical development of the office of Attorney-General, 
highlighting the increasing politicisation that occurred over time and the difficulties 
that resulted in terms of the exercise of statutory powers of prosecution. 
Secondly, the paper will analyse the functions of the modern day Attorney-General, 
determining which functions are no longer appropriate for a political officer to 
exercise. Reference will be made to case studies that illustrate the problems that 
have arisen periodically. 
Thirdly, the extent to which the courts have been prepared to review the 
Attorney-General's exercise of his discretionary powers will be addressed. 
The paper will then outline a number of possible options for reform of the office of 
Attorney-General in New Zealand. It will be the writer's submission that, although 
many of the problems inherent in the office anse from its political role, removal of 
the Attorney-General from either Cabinet or the political process altogether 1s 
neither desirable or necessary. 
To remove the Attorney-General from the political process would substantially 
negate the very reason for the existence of the office; namely to act as the chief 
legal advisor to the government of the day. If the Attorney-General was reduced to 
the status of a mere advisor, it would affect the forcefulness with which he/she 
could offer advice, especially on those issues with a substantial political content. 
The law making process is inextricably intertwined with politics, indeed legislation 
is often a codification of community standards and attitudes as represented through 
elected Members of Parliament. Considerations of public policy and political 
expediency are twin factors in the determination of the content of that legislation, 
along with the more technical requirements of government in modern society. 
Political considerations that may be legitimate for the government to take into 
account when determining policy will not be permissible when it comes to the 
application of a power of prosecution by the Attorney-General in particular 
instances if they are 
- 3 -
Anything savouring of personal advancement, protection or sympathy felt by 
an Attorney-General, or which relates to the political fortunes of his party 
and the government in power. (5) 
To conclude the paper, the writer adopts the proposal of Professor John Griffith (6) 
and Mr Jack Hodder (7) that an office entitled Advocate-General be created, with 
the responsibility of exercising both the civil law functions of the Attorney-General 
and the powers of prosecution contained in various statutes. 
THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL: - HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
A sketch of the development of the office of Attorney-General through history is 
necessary for an understanding of the nature of the wide ranging functions that fall 
to the modern day Attorney-General. 
The evolution of the office from simply the King's representative rn those cases 
where the Crown had an interest to a law officer with both important political and 
legal functions occurred gradually over a period of centuries. The historical sketch 
that follows highlights in particular the process by which the Attorney-General 
became the chief legal advisor of the elected government from a background of 
being the servant of the monarch. 
This change in the nature of the office of Attorney-General, and the functions 
attached to the office, brought with it inevitable conflict. On the one hand the 
Attorney-General has a constitutional 
non-partisan fashion while at the 
government in which he/she serves. 
Historical Sketch 
obligation to exercise his/her discretion m a 
same time having responsibilities to the 
The first attorney to undertake the function of representing the King in litigation 
before the courts was Lawrence del Brok in 1243. (8) de! Brok acted for the Crown 
in actions to recover rents and lands, and guard the Kings right to present churches, 
among many others. In addition, there existed an overriding duty of the King's 
Justice's to watch over the sovereign's interests and to assert his rights in any matter 
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involving a usurpation of the King's privileges. (9) At this stage in British history 
judicial independence was not the fundamental part of the legal system it is today. 
The foundations of the modern office of Attorney - General came with the accession 
to the throne of Henry IV in September 1399. A single King's Attorney with a right 
of audience in all royal courts replaced the spasmodic appointment of a number of 
attorney's each appearing in different courts, (10) although the actual use of the 
title "Attorney-General" did not begin until the appointment of John Herbert to the 
office in 1461. (11) 
During this period the Attorney-General served in the House of Lords rather than 
the House of Commons, refecting the original conception of the law officers as legal 
advisors and servants to the sovereign. The Attorney-General acted as advisor and 
attended deliberations of the House of Lords when called upon to do so, but did not 
enjoy any real responsibility for their Lordship 's decisions. (12) Since 1700, however, 
the Attorney-General has not attended the Lords, instead taking a seat in the House 
of Commons along with his junior law officer, the Solicitor-General. (13) 
Notwithstanding their new role as members of the House of Commons, successive 
Attorney's-General continued to practice at the bar and derive most of their income 
from that source. Even as early as 1616, during the term of Sir Francis Bacon, the 
office was considered to be worth six thousand pounds per annum, almost all of 
which came from representing private litigants. (14) Clearly the prestige of the 
office increased markedly the ability of its holder to charge high fees. At that time 
the Attorney-General's salary was just over eighty pounds , just 1% of his overall 
salary. (15) 
Given this huge disparity it was inevitable that conflict between private and public 
commitments would anse, and this was reflected rn the reluctance of 
Attorney's-General to see the office placed on the same terms as that of full time, 
salaried Minister's of the Crown. But it was not until the nineteenth century that 
increasing pressure began to be exerted in the House of Commons to secure more of 
the time and energies of the Attorney-General. (16) In 1894 the Gladstone 
government finally forbade the Attorney-General from engaging in private practice, 
although court appearances in contentious cases involving the Crown were still 
obligatory. (17) 
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The law officers objected to this prohibition fiercely. A memorandum to Cabinet 
from Lord Halsbury, Lord Chancellor, on behalf of the Attorney-General and 
Solicitor-General (18) made the point in the following terms: 
It makes Law Officers merely political officials; it puts them under an 
arrangement the acceptance of which with any other client would 
undoubtedly be a gross breach of professional rule, and would undoubtedly 
be punished by their being disbarred. (19) 
The Lord Chancellor's memorandum reflects the law officers' opinion that their 
offices could not be considered analogous with those of their ministerial colleagues. 
They continued to remain barristers in private practice, and as such took on work 
from a variety of sources in addition to the crown work they had responsibility for. 
The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General at that time considered themselves 
above politics, notwithstanding their membership of the House of Commons. 
The protest was to no avail, however, and Gladstone won the battle to make the law 
officers accountable to his government and the House of Commons on a full time 
basis. 
The workload, it seems, remained considerable even after the ability of the 
Attorney-General to engage in private practice was withdrawn. Sir Patrick Hastings, 
Attorney-General in 1924 during the first Labour government in the United 
Kingdom described his workload in these terms: 
My day began at seven o'clock in the morning and I rarely got to bed before 
five the next morning. The day was spent in one long rush between the Law 
Courts, government departments and the House of Commons. The night, or 
rather the early mornrng was needed in order to get ready for the next day. 
Nothing that I began was I ever allowed to finish and nothing was ever 
finished until something else was begun. Being an Attorney-General, as it was 
in those days, is my idea of hell. (20) 
While the establishment of a permanent Law Officers department 10 1893 had 
lessened some of the burden, the number of staff remained very small until 1931 
when the law officers voluntarily reduced their salaries in exchange for more staff. 
(21) The creation of the department was of great constitutional significance, 
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however. It occurred m the context of the growth in the functions 
which made necessary the development of government agencies 
permanent officials with a high degree of specialised and technical 
(22) 
of the state, 
staffed by 
knowledge. 
It had not come sooner because of the traditional attitude that the Attorney-General 
was counsel appointed to be the chief legal advisor of the Crown who, when able, 
was free to engage in private practice alongside government work. The creation of a 
separate department, along with the prohibition of private practice that followed in 
1894, was a reflection of the growing view among particularly members of the 
House of Commons that the Attorney-General was the servant of the people's 
representatives and should be readily available to advise on legal matters as they 
arose. As the legislation coming before Parliament became more voluminous and 
complex the demand for the services of the Attorney-General grew accordingly. 
Status as the government's chief legal advisor did not, however, bring with it a 
Cabinet position in the United Kingdom as compared to New Zealand where the 
Attorney-General is always a member of Cabinet. 
Successive governments in the United Kingdom doubted the constitutional propriety 
of combining in the office of Attorney-General responsibility, on the one hand, for 
deliberating upon matters across the purview of government, and on the other his 
absolute independence from Cabinet direction regarding the institution or 
withdrawal of criminal proceedings. But while no British Attorney-General since Sir 
Douglas Hogg, 1924-1928, has been accorded a position in Cabinet, there has been a 
recognition of the need to keep the Attorney-General fully informed of Cabinet 
deliberations. (23) Accordingly the Attorney-General 1s a member of Cabinet 
committees, has access to relevant papers and attends full Cabinet meetings to advise 
upon legal and constitutional issues. (24) 
It has been argued that the distinction between attendance at Cabinet meetings to 
advise and actual membership of Cabinet with a voice in the determination of 
government policies recognises the importance of preserving the independence and 
detachment necessary for the proper discharge of the Attorney-General's 
responsibilities.(25) In the writer's submission this distinction has developed more on 
the grounds of historical precedent, given the United Kingdom perception of the 
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Attorney- General as a legal advisor rather than a Minister of the Crown with full 
policy responsibilities, than upon grounds of principle. 
The existence or otherwise of Cabinet membership for the Attorney-General does 
not in itself shape the attitudes of the Attorney-General in exercising his/her 
functions, particularly 
informed of Cabinet 
implementation. 
New Zealand 
s10ce 10 the United Kingdom the Attorney-General 1s 
decisions and often asked for advice prior to their 
Upon acquiring sovereignty of New Zealand the Crown received those prerogatives 
which 
unless limited by Act of an Imperial Parliament or by an Act of the General 
Assembly made under the powers of some Act of the Imperial Parliament are 
the same as in England. (26) 
It was, therefore, as a prerogative officer that the first Attorney-General was 
appointed in 1840. Until the establishment of responsible government 10 New 
Zealand in 1856 the Attorney General was one of three officials which under the 
Governor comprised the Executive Council of the colony. (27) The practice of 
political appointments to the office began in 1856, with the Attorney-General sitting 
in either the House of Representatives or the Legislative Council and serving in the 
Ministry. (28) 
In 1866 Parliament took the radical step of changing the office of Attorney-General 
to a permanent, non-political appointment with the same status and independence of 
a Supreme Court judge. The Attorney-General was specifically excluded from 
membership of either House of Parliament and of the Executive Council under the 
Attorney-General's Act passed that year. The change occurred as a result of doubts 
among the political decision makers over the proper role of the Attorney- General 
and the constitutional arrangements that should exist to ensure the fulfillment of his 
independent functions. (29) 
This experiment with a non-political Attorney-General lasted just ten years, (30) and 
in 1876 an Act was passed providing that the tenure of the office was to be at the 
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pleasure of the Governor and that the appointee was free to be a Member of 
Parliament. 
In practice all Attorney's-General smce 1876 have been Members Of Parliament and 
of the Executive Council. It has been customary practice for the Attorney-General to 
also hold the position of Minister of Justice, although there have been exceptions to 
this practice. (31) The office reverted back to its original prerogative nature upon 
the passage of the Civil List Act 1920, under which the Governor-General appoints 
the Attorney-General on the Prime Minister's advice. 
Traditionally the Attorney-General has been a member of the bar, indeed m its 
history in New Zealand only one layman has held the office. The then Prime 
Minister, Rt Hon G W Forbes MP, was also Attorney-General between 1933 and 1935. 
During the period when Mr Forbes was Attorney-General, an anonymous contributor 
to the New Zealand Law Journal criticised the appointment of a layman to the 
office saying that as a result this country lagged behind m law reform and 
necessary legislation. (32) It is difficult to imagine a situation where this would 
occur again, particularly given the number of Members of Parliament presently 
holding legal qualifications. (33) 
The Functions of the Attorney-General 
The modern day Attorney-General is essentially a creature of party politics and this 
is reflected in both many of the functions that now fall to the holder of the office 
and the method of his selection. 
In the two party political system that currently is the norm in New Zealand, it is 
self-evident that the Attorney-General will either be a member of the Labour or 
National parties. If, as is currently the case, the Attorney-General 1s part of a 
Labour government, he owes his position m Cabinet to his caucus colleagues who 
elected him there. (34) The actual portfolios are determined by the Prime Minister 
who has total discretion in this regard. 
The need for an independent law officer may well be one factor that caucus takes 
into consideration when determining the composition of Cabinet, but given the 
nature of party politics it is safe to say that more weight would be placed upon 
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prospective Cabinet Ministers ability to be an effective advocate for the political 
agenda of the government, with the aim being its re-election. 
Selection of Cabinet under a National government is left entirely in the hands of 
the Prime Minister, both in terms of its composition and the allocation of portfolios. 
(35) While the same political realities will inevitably be considered by the Prime 
Minister, the fact of his sole discretion makes it more conceivable that an 
Attorney-General could be selected on merits that are not solely political. 
The office of Attorney-General entails a wide range of functions, of both a political 
and legal nature. Between the exercise of his powers relating to the conduct of 
prosecutions and the advocacy in Parliament of the policies of his government, the 
Attorney-General maintains an important position in the government of the day. 
In New Zealand it is usual practice for many of the legal powers vested in the 
Attorney-General to be exercised by the Solicitor-General. (36) The legal basis for 
this practice is s4 Acts Interpretation Act 1924 which provides that the functions of 
the Attorney-General may be exercised by the Solicitor-General, who is a public 
servant and the permanent head of the Crown Law Office. But while tn practice the 
Solicitor- General exercises control of criminal proceedings in most situations, the 
ultimate responsibility remains with the Attorney General as the principal Law 
Officer. 
The Attorney-General has the power to present an indictment where a person has 
been committed for trial, shared with the Crown Prosecutor or the informant in the 
case of a private prosecution. (37) The Attorney-General may also present an 
indictment where there has been no committal. (38) While the Attorney-General does 
not have power to initiate summary proceedings, he does have the power to stay 
such proceedings. (39) It is principally this power that has seen questions raised as to 
the level of independence with which it is exercised, as will be discussed below. ( 40) 
Another function of the Attorney-General that has potential for abuse 1s the 
discretion provided under a number of statutes to determine whether or not a 
prosecution should proceed. 
The Attorney-General's Discretion to Consent to Prosecutions 
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While the provision of such a discretion 1s best justified on the grounds that the 
statutes relate to matters which impact upon the public interest, there are no 
uniform guidelines as to when this discretion should be conferred. 
In response to a parliamentary question, the Attorney-General, Rt Hon Geoffrey 
Palmer, listed the following statutes as requiring his consent before a prosecution 
can be taken. ( 41) 
Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971, s74( 4) 
Antartica Act 1960, s3 
Companies Act 1955, s322 
Crimes Act 1961, ss 100, 101, 104, 105, 105A, 123, 124, 230, and 400 
Flags Emblems and Names Protection Act 1981, ss 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 
The Geneva Conventions Act 1958, s3 
All prosecutions under the Indecent Publications Act 1963 
Race Relations Act 1971, ss 24 and 25 
All prosecutions under the Secret Commissions Act 1910 
All prosecutions under the Submarine Cables and Pipelines Protection Act 
1966 
Video Recordings Act 1987 - all prosecutions, except those under ss 13, 14, 67, 
68 and under any regulations. 
The statutes contained in this answer, however, do not constitute a complete list. The 
following statutes also require the consent of the Attorney-General before a 
prosecution can be brought: 
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons and Hostages) Act 1980, s14 
Aviation Crimes Act, s18 
Summary Offences Act 1981, ss 20, and 20A 
New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987, 
s15 
And there may well be others. 
The incompleteness 
available guidelines 
of the Attorney-General's answer reflects the lack of readily 
or precedents to determine when this discretion should be 
included in a statute, other than for the broad reason that it is necessary to protect 
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the "public interest". As one commentator has noted, "the suspicion arises that m 
some instances precedent was followed rather blindly". ( 42) 
Three distinct categories can be drawn, however, from the statutes referred to above. 
The first category comprises those statutes which impose limits rn one way or 
another upon either freedom of speech or expression. Examples include the Indecent 
Publications Act 1963 and the Race Relations Act 1971. Given the prevailing view 
in democractic societies that these fundamental freedoms should have limits placed 
upon them only where there 1s some greater public interest to protect, it is 
appropriate that the Attorney-General has the power to prevent prosecutions that are 
either frivolous or constitute an attempt to unreasonably gag free speech or 
express10n. 
This discretion has the potential to bring with it controversy, as evidenced by the 
recent remarks of Mrs Hana Jackson "kill a white before you die and become a 
hero". ( 43) There was considerable public debate over whether Mrs Jackson should be 
prosecuted for inciting racial disharmony under s25 Race Relations Act 1971, which 
reqmres the consent of the Attorney-General. While it turned out in this particular 
situation that the matter turned upon another issue, ( 44) it is not difficult to see 
how in such a case where public feelings are running high that the Attorney-General 
may be tempted to equate the public interest with the interests of his political party. 
The fact that no statutory guidelines exist for the exercise of this discretion 
compounds this potential problem. 
The second category comprises those statutes which relate to New Zealand's 
obligations at international law. Examples include the Antartica Act 1960, Geneva 
Conventions Act 1958 and the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and 
Arms Control Act 1987. Given that the control of a nation's foreign affairs rests 
squarely with the government, it is inappropriate for private citizens to seek to 
enforce alleged breaches of the law in this area without the consent of the 
government. 
But that does not necessarily mean that the Attorney-General alone ought to be 
vested with final responsibility for prosecutions. There is a strong argument to 
suggest that Cabinet as a whole should make those decisions, particularly where it is 
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likely that they will impact on New Zealand's foreign relations. An example of this 
would be if another country sailed into our harbours a nuclear powered and armed 
vessel thereby breaching s6 of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament 
and Arms Control Act 1988. Decision over whether a prosecution is to be attempted 
is surely, in this instance, a major policy decision with wide ramifications for our 
foreign relations. It would not, therefore, be appropriate to leave matters of this 
magnitude to be decided by one member of Cabinet, not even the Attorney-General. 
The prosecution of the two French agents responsible for the bombing of the 
Rainbow Warrior, Marfart and Prieur, may also fall into this category because of its 
implications for this country's relationship with France. As it turned out, 
prosecution of the two agents under the Crimes Act 1961 was left to the 
Solicitor-General. The Attorney-General, Mr Palmer, was not involved because of his 
direction that the Solicitor-General would deal with matters of criminal law unless 
the Solicitor-General specifically referred a case to him. ( 45) No such referral was 
made in this case. 
Mr Palmer rejected criticism that he should have made the decision because of the 
possible ramifications for trade with France on the grounds that : 
If the decisions are to be made by the Attorney-General in this class of case, 
the allegation of political interference will often be irresistable in the mind 
of the public. ( 46) 
Mr Palmer's predecessor as Attorney-General, Hon Jim McLay MP, was among those 
who felt that he should have exercised his discretion rather than the 
Solicitor-General "because it was undoubtedly politically controversial". (47) In the 
writer's submission, the Attorney-General should have exercised the discretion 
personally, not simply because the matter was politically controversial, but because 
of the potentially serious implications for New Zealand's trade and diplomatic 
relations with France that surrounded the conduct of the affair. 
While Attorney-General, Mr McLay instituted a working relationship with the 
Solicitor-General whereby all politically controversial matters were to be referred 
him for action. The standard test used for defining when a situation was "politically 
controversial" developed by Mr McLay was whether or not he "might be called up to 
answer for the matter in Parliament or perhaps in the media". ( 48) 
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This constitutes a fundamental difference m the conception of how the powers of 
the Attorney-General should be exercised. While Mr McLay adopted the standard 
practice of leaving the day to day administration of the criminal law to the 
Solicitor-General, his readiness to involve himself in those cases with a political 
flavour indicates a more "hands on" attitude than that of Mr Palmer. It also 
indicates an acknowledgment that the statutory powers of the Attorney-General, 
which traditionally have been unreviewable by the courts, bring with them 
accountability to Parliament whether or not the exercise of those powers is delegated 
to the Solicitor-General. 
In the case of the Rainbow Warrior bombing, it was only after the two agents had 
gone through the judicial process that Cabinet asserted its overriding interest in the 
matter and negotiated a re-settlement package with the French government. 
The third category comprises those statutes which have broad domestic security 
implications. Examples include the Secret Commissions Act 1910 and the Armed 
Forces Discipline Act 1971. Again it is proper for the government of the day, 
through the Attorney-General, to retain control of such a sensitive area of New 
Zealand law. 
New Zealand 1s not unique m its failure to have established guidelines for the 
conferment of the discretion to prosecute m statutes. Some years ago the Home 
Office in Great Britain acknowledged that 
there does not seem to have been a firmly established policy, closely adhered 
to over the years, governing decisions by Parliament whether to include a 
restriction on the bringing of prosecutions m a new statute, and whether to 
place the control with the Director of Public Prosecutions or the 
Attorney-General. (49) 
The Home Office did, however, identify five roam reasons for the use of the 
statutory discretion: 
a) to secure consistency of practice m bringing prosecutions, for instance 
where it is not possible to define the offence very precisely, so that the law 
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goes wider than the mischief aimed at or is open to a variety of interpretations. 
b) to prevent abuse, or the bringing of law into disrepute, for example with 
the kind of offence which might otherwise result in vexatious prosecutions or 
the institution of proceedings in trivial cases. 
c) to enable account to be taken of mitigating factors, which may vary so 
widely from case to case that they are not susceptible of statutory definition. 
d) to provide some central control over the use of the criminal law when it 
has to intrude into areas which are particularly sensitive or controversial 
such as race relations or censorship. 
e) to ensure that decisions on prosecutions take account of important 
considerations of public policy or of a political or international charactar. 
(50) 
The Home Office considered that while the last two grounds would be appropriate 
for the intervention of the Attorney-General, the others ought to be solely the 
domain of the Director of Public Prosecution. (51) 
There 1s an apparent paradox underlying the Attorney-General's functions, since he 
must both ensure that decisions on prosecutions take account of important 
considerations of public policy while at the same time remaining impervious to 
partisan political influences. A former United Kingdom Attorney-General, Mr 
Samuel Silkin, QC, acknowledged this and suggested that the exercise of his 
discretion to prosecute required a common sense judgment balancing "different 
goods and different evils, conflicting rights, freedoms, duties, responsibilities and 
public interests". (52) 
Mr Silkin was of the view that: 
If I make my decisions on a party political basis, I deserve all the criticism 
which I am likely to receive. But if I ignore political considerations in the 
widest sense of that term then I am failing in my responsibilities and 
courting disaster. (53) 
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Therefore the public policy content of the Attorney-General's decision gives it an 
unavoidably political complexion, for better or worse. 
In acting independently the Attorney-General still has to reach a conclusion on the 
public interest in each particular case, and in doing so his thinking is sure to be 
coloured by not only his personal beliefs but also the perceptions of society that 
shape those views. Pressure may not be deliberately applied to the Attorney-General 
by his colleagues, but the more pervasive influence of his political and philosophical 
beliefs, which are harder for the public to identify, may come to distort the 
Attorney-General's view of Parliament's intention in enacting the discretion that he 
has to exercise. 
The Attorney-General's Power to Stay Proceedings 
In New Zealand the power of the Attorney-General to enter a stay of proceedings is 
statutory, rather than the prerogative power enjoyed in the past. (54) 
While the power to stay proceedings does not apply to summary proceedings per se, 
(55) it has been extended to criminal proceedings in the District Court by way of 
amendment to the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. (56) This power has been used on 
a number of occasions to stay proceedings in circumstances where the suspicion of 
improper political considerations influencing the Attorney - General in making his 
decision has existed. 
Before examining the New Zealand cases, however, it is necessary to look at two 
important precedents, from both the United Kingdom and Australia that have been 
instrumental in determining the guidelines that now restrain the Attorney-General's 
use of the power to stay proceedings. 
The Campbell Case 
The most influential precedent in terms of its effect throughout the Commonwealth 
occurred during the term of office of the first Labour government in the United 
Kingdom in 1924. 
While it was the withdrawal of one particular prosecution, and the subsequent 
events that followed, that brought down the Ramsey MacDonald government, 
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involvement of the Cabinet m the administration of the criminal law went 
somewhat wider and was of great constitutional significance in that government's 
term of office. 
Although it was not revealed until after the change of government, the MacDonald 
Cabinet at its meeting on 6 August 1924 had given an express direction that no 
political prosecution should be directed by the Attorney-General without the 
sanction of Cabinet. (57) The effect of such a general directive was to place the 
Attorney-General, Sir Patrick Hastings, tn a position of subservience to the 
executive in all matters falling within the scope of the direction. 
The directive was a result of the controversy that followed the institution then 
withdrawal of a prosecution against John Ross Campbell, the Acting Editor of the 
Workers Weekly magazine. The magazine, which described itself as the official organ 
of the Communist Party of Great Britain, published an article urging the armed 
forces not to turn their guns on fellow workers from their own country, but to "turn 
their weapons on their oppressors". (58) 
Upon the request of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney-General 
considered the matter and gave the necessary consent to a prosecution under the 
Incitement to Mutiny Act 1797. 
The prosecution was subsequently raised in the House of Commons and proved to be 
particularly unpopular with the government backbenchers, many of whom shared 
the view of Mr Campbell that the armed forces should not be used to break up 
industrial disputes. Similarly, the prosecution was unpopular with the Prime 
Minister, Ramsey MacDonald, who wanted the prosecution withdrawn. (59) 
After pressure had been bought to bear upon the Attorney-General by the Cabinet, 
the prosecution was withdrawn. There followed a heated debate over the 
constitutionality of this pressure, which was perceived to be motivated by political 
considerations. 
Aside from the abhorrence in which the general direction from Cabinet was held in, 
the case was also controversial because the public interest had not been considered 
at all, and if it was the government considered its own political interests to be 
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paramount. There had, after all, been previous occasions where prosecutions had 
been withdrawn after wide consultation with, and perhaps pressure from Cabinet. 
In R v Rees (60) proceedings were instituted in February 1916 against a trade umon 
official for attempting to impede and delay the production of war material, an 
offence under the Defence of the Realm Act 1914. The Attorney-General consulted 
with the Minister of Munitions, who handled negotiations with the union involved 
and the prosecutions were subsequently withdrawn after a settlement was agreed to 
by both parties. Such a settlement, which allowed normal production of necessary 
war materials to resume, was obviously in the public interest and overrode fears of 
political partisanship affecting the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion. 
This can be contrasted with the Campbell case where condemnation of the 
governments actions was universal and where no public interest was served in 
withdrawing the prosecution. 
The opposition Conservative and Liberal parties subsequently combined forces in the 
House of Commons to pass a motion setting up a Select Committee to inquire into 
the whole affair. The government obtained a dissolution of Parliament and lost the 
subsequent election. (61) 
The general direction at the centre of the controversy was quickly rescinded by the 
incoming Baldwin government, which condemned it in harsh terms; 
Such an intrusion, rn the opinion of the government, was unconstitutional, 
subversive of the administration of justice and derogatory to the office of 
Attorney-General (62) 
The Campbell case led to a crystallisation of the modern rule that decisions to 
commence or discontinue prosecutions are for the Attorney-General alone. While he 
may consult with his colleagues, the Cabinet should not instruct him as to a 
particular course of action. 
As this rule as subsequently developed, however, there have been rare but 
significant occasions where the combined political might of the Attorney-General's 
parliamentary colleagues ensured the rule's breach. One such occasion, the 
resignation of Australian Attorney-General Robert Ellicott in 1977, highlights the 
strength of the rule and illustrates the likely consequences of its breach. 
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The Resignation of Robert Ellicott 
As with the controversy m the United Kingdom over the Campbell case, the 
resignation of Robert Ellicott, Australian Attorney-General in 1977, was precipitated 
by a criminal prosecution with considerable political overtones. Unlike Sir Patrick 
Hastings, the Attorney-General at the time of the Campbell case, Mr Ellicott chose to 
resign rather than continue as part of a government that had sought to improperly 
influence the exercise of his independent discretion over criminal prosecutions. 
The prosecution at the centre of the controversy began with the laying of an 
information by a private citizen against Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister between 
1972-1975, the then Senator Lionel Murphy who had held the office of 
Attorney-General in that period, and a number of other Ministers m that 
administration. 
The information charged the defendants with conspiracy to effect an unlawful 
purpose under s86 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act. The alleged unlawful purpose 
was deceiving the Governor-General into approving a loan of $4000 million for 
"temporary purposes" when in fact it was for twenty years and designed to meet the 
long term energy needs of the government. (63) 
The consent of the Attorney-General, who had taken office just one month 
previously, was then sought to his taking over the proceedings. Prior to deciding 
whether or not to give his consent, Mr Ellicott sought further information from the 
Solicitor-General, his department, officials of Treasury and the Executive Council. 
Treasury refused to provide the evidence requested on the grounds that it related to 
the previous Labour administration and consequently should not be handed over. 
(64) 
Having failed to obtain the documents necessary to reach a decision, Mr Ellicott 
sought the release of the documents from Cabinet. The Cabinet rejected the 
Attorney-General's request invoking Crown Privilege. Some time after the 
resignation of Mr Ellicott, the High Court subsequently ordered the release of all the 
documents, save one, upon application of the private prosecutor, thereby rejecting 
the Cabinet's assertion that the principle of Crown privilege was applicable. (65) 
- 19 -
This ruling of the court was particularly significant as previously special privilege 
had been accorded documents such as Cabinet minutes, papers and other documents 
recording top level government decision making. 
The decision of the High Court was similar to that of the Supreme Court of the 
United States over the Watergate scandal. The Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox, 
had sought access to relevant tapes of President Nixon's discussions with officials 
only to be refused on the grounds of executive privilege. The Supreme Court 
rejected the President's assertion of privilege saying " ... The generalised assertion of 
privilege must yield to the demonstrated specific need for evidence in a pending 
criminal trial". ( 66) 
In turning down the request for access to relevant documents the Cabinet implicitly 
rejected the Attorney-General's view that; 
There is no place where the criminal law does not run, even in the Executive 
Council, nor can any convention that a government should not look into the 
affairs of a previous government prevent inquiry for the purposes of 
enforcing the criminal law. (67) 
But the intervention of the Cabinet did not end with simply a refusal of access to 
evidence. At its meeting on 26 July 1988 the Cabinet urged the Attorney-General to 
take over the prosecution for the purpose of terminating it. (68) After taking advice 
of counsel, however, the Attorney-General decided against taking over the 
prosecutions. 
Some weeks later, on 6 September 1977, 
Attorney-General. In his letter of resignation 
Fraser MP, Mr Ellicott said he was resigning; 
Mr Ellicott resigned his office as 
to the Prime Minister, Hon Malcolm 
because decisions and actions which you and the Cabinet have recently made 
and taken have impeded and m my opinion have constituted an attempt to 
direct or control the exercise by me as Attorney-General of my discretion 10 
relation to the criminal proceedings m Sankey v Whitlam and Others. In the 
circumstances I feel that I have no other course but to resign my office. I 
regard it as vital to our system of government that the Attorney-General's 
discretion in criminal matters remain completely independent. (69) 
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By denying the Attorney-General access to the documents in the government's 
possession and at the same time counselling the termination of embarrassing criminal 
proceedings, it can scarcely be wondered that the Attorney-General perceived the 
Cabinet's action as a direct interference with his independent discretion. In this case 
the embarrassment to the government was not lessened because the Minister's at the 
centre of the proceedings were their political opponents. The political interest the 
Cabinet sought to protect was a substantial one; namely that there should not be 
created an undesirable precedent for the over zealous scrutinising of the records of 
the past government in the light of the law. 
It had seemed that the Prime Minister and Attorney-General were at one over the 
principles governing the exercise of the discretion. The Prime Minister did not 
question the extent of the discretion, but he did insist that; 
It is, nevertheless, proper for the Attorney-General to consult with and have 
regard to the views of his colleagues, even though the responsibility for the 
eventual decision to prosecute or not rests with the Attorney- General, and 
with the Attorney-General alone. (70) 
But it was in the application of the principle that the rift arose. 
Nor was the Prime Minister alone in his interpretation of the exercise of the 
Attorney-General's discretion. An editorial in the Australian Law Journal, for 
example, considered that since the nature of the criminal proceedings was 
inseparably connected with politics, Cabinet and not the Attorney-General was the 
best judge of the public interest. (71) The editorial went on to express doubt as to 
whether the principles considered so fundamental by Mr Ellicott were ever designed 
to extend to criminal proceedings of this type. (72) 
This writer disagrees strongly with that opinion. The principle of the absolute 
independence of the Attorney-General rn the exercise of discretionary powers was 
developed to prevent exactly what the Fraser Cabinet was trying to achieve in this 
case; namely a decision as to whether or not a prosecution should proceed being 
made on improper political grounds. The Attorney-General, by virtue of his duty to 
act in a politically impartial manner, is best qualified to determine the public 
interest in cases such as these and decide upon the most appropriate course of action 
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accordingly. The Attorney-General may of course consult with his colleagues, indeed 
in a case with political overtones he would be foolish not to, but in the end the 
decision must be his alone. 
The issue 1s not whether the Attorney-General makes the correct decision, even 
presuming there is such a thing, in a particular case. Rather, the established 
existence of the Attorney-General's discretion in the conduct of the criminal law 
exists to give the public confidence in the continued integrity of the administration 
of that law, notwithstanding changes of government. 
Robert Ellicott has been the only Attorney-General in the Commonwealth to resign 
because of government interference in the exercise of his discretion. His resignation 
highlighted to not only the Australian politicians and members of the public, but 
also to Law Officers throughout the Commonwealth, the constant need to reinforce 
the independence of the Attorney-General by exemplifying the integrity of the 
holders of the off ice. 
While the administration of the criminal law by successive Attorney's-General m 
New Zealand has not seen the dramatic controversy that has surrounded their 
counterparts in Australia and the United Kingdom, there have been occasions when 
the appearance of political impartiality has been in doubt. 
The Attorney- General's 
Superannuation Act 1974 
Decision to Stay Proceedings Brought under the 
In December 1975 the Prime Minister of the newly elected government, Hon R D 
Muldoon MP, publicly announced that when Parliament next sat it would pass 
retrospective legislation to repeal the Superannuation Act 1974. Accordingly, Mr 
Muldoon purported to suspend the operation of the superannuation scheme and 
advised employers not to make the deductions from their employees salaries as 
required under the Act. 
This was subsequently declared by Wild CJ in Fitzgerald v Muldoon (73) to be 
contrary to the Bill of Rights 1688 which provides that Parliament makes the laws 
and it is only Parliament that can repeal those laws. 
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Mr Muldoon's actions were also attacked on another front. A number of private 
prosecutions were brought against the Ford Motor Company for failing to make the 
deductions required by the Act. 
On 1 April 1976 the Attorney-General, Hon P I Wilkinson MP, announced that he 
had entered stays of these proceedings under s77A Summary Proceedings Act 1957. 
(74) The decision to enter a stay of proceedings was based upon the reliance that 
virtually everyone in the community had placed upon the Prime Minister's statement 
purporting to suspend the operation of the scheme. 
The Attorney-General considered that to permit the private prosecutions to proceed 
could cause chaotic results in the administration of justice. (75) He also did not 
believe that either the public interest or the interests of justice would be served by 
allowing the deductions under the Act to continue in force until Parliament met to 
repeal it, as the deductions would then have to be repaid. (76) 
The Attorney-General concluded his explanation by claiming that: 
The danger in a controversy of this nature is that the factor of common sense 
can get overlooked - particularly when the arguments become too theoretical 
or hypothetical. We cannot run a government by theory and hypothesis. (77) 
This explanation found favour with many, including the Auckland District Law 
Society which, while objecting to the government's handling of the wider issue of 
suspending the scheme, did not criticise the actions of the Attorney-General. (78) 
Constitutionally, however, the action of the Attorney-General in entering a stay of 
proceedings was of doubtful validity given the judgment in Fitzgerald v Muldoon 
that the original act by the Prime Minister was unlawful. What is more, if the 
matter was of such urgency, the Prime Minister could have called Parliament 
together to pass the necessary legislation much earlier than 22 June 1976 when it 
was eventually summoned. 
The lack of urgency evident in the time the government took in actually passing the 
legislation is illustrative of the prevailing feeling that the matter was a fait 
accompli even before Parliament sat. That feeling existed because under the two 
party system existing in New Zealand it was reasonable to assume that the 
legislation would be passed by Parliament. 
- 23 -
No doubt this was a major factor considered by the Attorney-General in coming to 
his decision. But the competing principle of public interest that should have been 
considered is that the law of the land be upheld. The writer's view is that protecting 
the integrity of the law, and the process by which it is passed, is of more importance 
then a so called "common sense" solution. 
To claim that the government's strength of numbers in Parliament gives it the right 
to suspend the operation of the law as and when it thinks fit would be to implicitly 
reject the constitutional gains made by the predecessors of todays politicians as far 
back as 1688 when the Bill of Rights was introduced. In a democracy such as New 
Zealand, where no government enjoys the political support of all its citizens, the 
success of the system depends in large part upon an acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the law making process by its citizens. If legislation passed by Parliament in the 
prescribed manner was overturned regularly by executive decree, the legitimacy of 
the system would be tainted in the eyes of many. 
While there would have been administrative difficulties caused by the repayment of 
deductions later made unnecessary by retrospective legislation, in the writer' s 
submission such difficulties would have been preferable to the Attorney-General' s 
use of his discretion to stay proceedings in this way. 
Would the Attorney-General have acted m the same way if the Prime Minister 
himself had been the subject of a private prosecution for his actions in the matter ? 
It was of course possible that the Prime Minister could have faced a prosecution 
under s66 Crimes Act 1961 for being a party to the substantive offence. (79) If such 
a situation had arisen, an already politically loaded prosecution would have become 
more embarrassing to the government and left the Attorney-General with an 
unenviable set of options. Certainly it would be difficult to give an absolute 
guarantee that the Attorney -General would exercise his discretion impartially, and 
this would undermine the integrity of the office in much the same way that it did 
in the United Kingdom at the time of the Campbell case. 
The Attorney-General ' s Decision to Stay Proceedings Brought under the Trespass Act 
1968: The Bastion Point Controversy 
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Of less constitutional significance, but nevertheless of much political importance, 
was the decision of the Attorney-General in August 1978 to issue a stay of 
proceedings in respect of one hundred and seventy prosecutions under the Trespass 
Act 1968 brought against protesters allegedly trespassing on Crown owned land at 
Bastion Point. 
The Attorney-General, Mr Wilkinson, announced his decision after fifty of the 
protesters had been convicted by the courts but not given any penalty. He based his 
decision on two grounds; namely the "interests of justice" and the "public interest". 
(80) Justifying his decision on the grounds that it was in the interests of justice, the 
Attorney-General pointed out that the legal issues were clear and that, given the 
nature of the trespass and the fact that no penalty had been imposed upon those 
already prosecuted, it was not unfair to stay the prosecutions. Mr Wilkinson said 
that "had penalties been imposed the situation would have been different", (81) 
which indicates the importance that he attached to that point. 
The public interest, said the Attorney-General, would not be served by continuing 
with the outstanding prosecutions because of the likely result of the cases and the 
remaining time that would be taken to deal with them. (82) The Attorney-General's 
view that prosecutions had " degenerated into a farce, without meaning other than 
to clog up the courts for another eight months" (83) was also a factor in the decision 
to enter the stay of prosecutions. To allow the prosecutions to proceed would leave 
open the future possibility of organised attempts to undermine the court system by 
provoking mass arrest situations leading to mass prosecutions, which in turn would 
clog up the resources of the courts. (84) 
It is not unreasonable for the Attorney-General to take such a factor into account 
when exercising his discretion to enter a stay of proceedings. As the principal Law 
Officer the Attorney-General does have a responsibility to act with the best interests 
of the court system firmly in mind, and on occasion those interests will best be 
served by not prosecuting clear breaches of the criminal law. It is important, 
however, that in carrying out that responsibility party political considerations are 
not taken into account. 
The difficulty apparent from the Bastion Point controversy anses from the fact that 
Cabinet, while not a party to the actual decision to enter a stay of proceedings, was 
intimately involved prior to that action being taken by the Attorney-General. The 
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decision to invoke the Trespass Act to clear the protesters from the land was taken 
by Cabinet as a matter of policy. The prosecutions subsequently turned out badly 
and, arguably, became a political embarrassment to the government. Accordingly the 
public interest that the Attorney-General relied upon m exercising his discretion 
coincided with the political advantage of the government. Even the appearance of 
using the justice system for political gains is damaging to the system's integrity, and 
that of the office of Attorney-General. 
Solicitor-General v Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand. (85) 
The most recent occasion upon which the political independence of the 
Attorney-General was called into question arose from the contempt of court charges 
laid against John Banks MP in December 1986. (86) 
The Solicitor-General issued two sets of proceedings for contempt of court. The first 
was against Mr Banks and the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand, and the 
second was against Mr Banks and Wellington Newspapers. The Crown alleged that in 
the course of a nation wide talkback programme and an article published by 
Wellington Newspapers, Mr Banks had made statements implying that three 
individuals, then the subject of separate criminal proceedings for murder, had 
previous convictions. The Solicitor-General contended that the making and 
publication of such statements before trial was likely and calculated to prejudice the 
trials of the three accused. (87) 
The actual merits of the charges, which were eventually dismissed by Davison CJ, 
are not at issue m this paper's discussion of the case. Rather, it is the repeated 
allegations made by senior members of the Opposition that the Attorney-General, Mr 
Palmer, initiated the prosecution and that he did so motivated by party political 
considerations. These allegations were at all times denied by both the 
Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, Mr Paul Neazor QC. 
There IS no question that the proceedings arose m the context of a widespread 
public debate on law and order issues in the latter part of 1986. Crimes of violence 
were increasing at a rapid 
highlighting to the public 
rate, with a number of particularly VICIOUS murders 
the magnitude of the problem. Mr Banks, as the 
Opposition Spokesman on Police, took a major part in the debate as did Mr Palmer 
in his role as Minister of Justice, and considered that the penalties for persons 
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convicted of cnmes of violence were inadequate, and held Mr Palmer responsible for 
this state of affairs. 
It was his view that Mr Palmer was " ... the weakest Minister of Justice the House has 
ever seen". (88) Mr Palmer held a similar lack of respect for his opponent's abilities, 
stating in Parliament that "I think his speeches are vicious and demented". (89) 
Claims by Mr Banks and his caucus colleagues that the prosecutions were instituted 
upon improper political grounds had as their genesis two factors; one an affidavit 
sworn by a member of the Attorney-General's staff, the second a number of earlier 
public comments by the Prime Minister that the Opposition considered to be at least 
as capable of constituting a contempt of court as those made by Mr Banks but were 
not the subject of contempt charges. 
Ms Jillian King, Executive Assistant (Media) to the Attorney-General, said 10 her 
affidavit that following discussions with the Attorney- General 
I was directed to advise the Solicitor-General of the Media Statement and, at 
his request, sent a copy to him. (90) 
In response to questioning in the House, the Attorney-General said that he had 
... a standing agreement with the Solicitor- General that any statements made 
by members of Parliament that may amount to contempt are to be dealt with 
by him and not by me. Therefore I would refer to him all material of such a 
nature that came across my desk. (91) 
This declaration by the Attorney- General of his independence 10 these matters 
failed to satisfy Paul East MP, Opposition Shadow Attorney-General, who claimed 
that the Attorney-General had referred to the Solicitor-General only two Press 
Statements, both from Mr Banks. (92) Mr East was unhappy that contempt 
proceedings had been brought against Mr Banks while no such action had been taken 
with respect to comments made in 1984 by the Prime Minister. 
Mr Lange had described Peter Fulcher, who at that time was 10 the process of being 
extradited from Australia to face serious drug charges in this country, as "a criminal 
who was the top heavy wholesale drug dealer in New Zealand. He is a thug. " (93) 
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Subsequently Mr Fulcher wrote to Mr East complaining that he could not get a fair 
trial in New Zealand in light of the Prime Minister's comments. (94) 
The Attorney-General's motives were also publicly questioned by Mr Lange's 
predecessor as Prime Minister, Rt Hon Sir Robert Muldoon, who, in referring to the 
Fulcher and Banks cases claimed that 
Mr Palmer now has a duty to publicly explain why he took this attitude m 
the two cases as clearly the immediate conclusion is that his motivation m 
each case rather than the proper exercise of his Ministerial duty. (95) 
The Attorney-General denied the allegations of impropriety, saying that it would be 
quite wrong for him to make decisions of that type relating to his political 
colleagues. (96) The Attorney-General was defended by his fellow Law Officer, the 
Solicitor-General, in subsequent corrospondence with Sir Robert Muldoon. 
The Solicitor-General expressed his regret to Sir Robert that he and Mr Banks had 
publicly suggested that the proceedings were motivated " ... by some notion of party 
political influence or advantage ... ". (97) In concluding his letter, Mr Neazor said that 
he was 
well aware of the need to tread an impartial and non-political line m the 
case of the Law Officers' powers ... (98) 
Yet the allegations of political partisanship on the part of the Attorney-General did 
not subside even after the receipt of the Solicitor-General's letter. Mr Banks 
continued to regard the prosecution as a "sinister, government funded charge" while 
the Leader of the Opposition, Hon Jim Bolger MP, accused the Attorney-General of 
conducting a vendetta against Mr Banks. (99) 
The reluctance of semor members of the Opposition to accept the Attorney-General's 
protestations of political independence illustrates the difficulties of a member of 
Cabinet serving as Attorney-General. 
The General Election was scheduled for August 1987, just a few weeks after the 
charges were heard in court. The Opposition considered that the proceedings were an 
effort to gag Mr Banks, whom they considered had conducted " ... a very upfront 
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campaign against violence which had shown the Minister of Justice to be 
ineffectual..." (100) Such allegations could not have occurred had the 
Attorney-General been a non-political civil servant, as Is the case with the 
Solicitor-General. 
When the Attorney-General IS also Deputy Prime Minister, as is the case with Mr 
Palmer, the possibility of Opposition members and others in the community doubting 
his integrity becomes even greater because that person is closely identified with the 
government's policies and its campaign for eventual re-election. 
Relator Actions 
The role of the Attorney-General as guardian of the public interest 1s not limited to 
the exercise of his discretion to prosecute at criminal law. The Attorney -General Is 
also vested with sole authority to uphold and enforce public rights by virtue of the 
royal prerogative. 
At common law it has traditionally been considered that no individual has standing 
to sue for a declaration or injunction to prevent public wrong unless he can show 
either that his own private rights will be interfered with or that he will suffer 
special damage peculiar to himself. (101) A private citizen without such standing 
may seek permission from the Attorney-General to bring a relator action. The 
Attorney-General has standing to obtain either an injunction or a declaration in any 
case affecting the public at large and the relator action is a means by which the 
private citizen may "borrow" his superior standing. (102) Once the 
Attorney-General's consent has been obtained, the relator usually has a free hand to 
conduct the proceedings even though Ill theory the control rests with the 
Attorney- General. (103) 
While relator actions are now of less significance srnce the move towards more 
relaxed rules of locus standi, (104) they remain an important part of the powers 
enjoyed by the holder of the Attorney -General's office. In New Z ealand no 
controversy has arisen over the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion as to 
whether or not consent should be granted to enable a private citizen to conduct a 
relator action. Cooke J, as he then was, speaking extra - judicially in 1975 said that in 
his experience the Attorney-General's consent was 
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readily and promptly granted if the papers were m order and there was 
something akin to a prima facie case. (105) 
That is not to say, however, that in the future such controversy could not occur, as 
it did in Great Britain a little over ten years ago. 
Gouriet v Union of Post Office Workers (106) 
The decision of the House of Lords in Gouriet is of enormous importance in any 
consideration of the constitutional role of the Attorney-General, the exercise of his 
discretion with respect to relator actions, and the availability of judicial review of 
that discretion. 
Much comment has been passed on their Lordships' judgments, mostly critical of the 
conservative approach adopted. (107) 
The facts of the case can be stated quite briefly. In January 1977, the Union of Post 
Office Workers (UPW) executive decided to call upon their members not to handle 
mail destined for South Africa, which would constitute an offence under the Post 
Office Act. The decision was broadcast over television and Mr Gouriet applied 
through his solicitor to the Attorney- General for a relator action against the UPW 
for an injunction restraining them from soliciting or procuring any person wilfully 
to delay any mail to South Africa. A few hours later the Attorney-General refused 
to give his consent, giving no reasons other than that he had considered all the 
circumstances including the public interest. 
Mr Gouriet then issued a writ m his own name against the UPW. At first instance it 
was rejected, only to be subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. Finally, the 
House of Lords rejected the application for an injunction. 
The Court of Appeal, led by Lord Denning MR, adopted an innovative approach to 
the traditional requirement that the Attorney-General's consent be granted before a 
relator action can be brought. While the Court of Appeal accepted that it had no 
jurisdiction over the Attorney-General's exercise of his discretion, it considered that 
other interests should be taken into account. (108) 
In the view of Lawton LJ 
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The problem still remains, however, whether after the Attorney-General's 
refusal to consent to a relator action, the plaintiff is without rights of any 
kind to try and get the criminal law enforced when its breach will deprive 
him and all other persons in the realm of their right to use the facilities 
provided by the Post Office. (109) 
This concern prompted the court to relax the requirements of locus standi and allow 
the action to proceed, notwithstanding 
the action. This residual category 
the Attorney-General' s refusal to consent to 
created by the Court of Appeal, whereby 
individuals with a real interest in the matter at issue could bring an action without 
the consent of the Attorney -General, resulted from that court's disenchanment with 
the existing law and the probable consequences of applying it to Mr Gouriet. 
It was Lord Denning's view that 
... If the contention of the Attorney-General is correct, it means he is the final 
arbiter as to whether the law should be enforced or not. If he does not act 
himself - or refuses to give his consent to his name being used - then the law 
will not be enforced. If one Attorney -General after another does this, if each 
in his turn declines to take action against those who break the law - then the 
law becomes a dead letter. (110) 
The House of Lords unanimously rejected the reasoning of the Court of Appeal and 
re-affirmed the traditional doctrine that a plaintiff seeking to bring a relator action 
must first obtain the Attorney-General's consent. Lord Wilberforce confirmed that it 
was the exclusive right of the Attorney-General to represent the public interest and 
said that "the decisions as to the public interest .. . are not such as the courts are fitted 
to take". (111) 
The Attorney-General may be called upon to make decisions which bring with them 
a risk of political criticism, and these are outside the range of discretionary 
problems which the courts can resolve. (112) Their Lordship 's considered that the 
problem with opening up such a possibility was that it involves proceeding upon the 
basis that the Attorney-General 1s rn no better position than any other citizen to 
decide what is best in the public interest. Lord Edmund Davies adopted the 
reasoning of Pearce LJ in Attorney -General v Harris (113); namely that 
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the Attorney-General frequently has sources of information not generally 
available and must bear in mind considerations which may be undervalued 
when one considers injury to the public merely in terms of immediate injury. 
(114) 
Accordingly, the appropriate remedy for a person aggrieved by the 
Attorney-General's decision lay in the political arena and not with the courts. (115) 
Lord Fraser of Tullybelton justified excluding the Attorney-General's exercise of his 
discretion from the perview of the courts on the grounds that 
... his error would not be an error of law but would be one of political 
judgment, using the expression of course not in a party sense but in the sense 
of weighing the relative importance of different aspects of the public interest 
(116) 
It is the submission of the writer that such a view 1s no longer tenable given the 
realities of modern party politics. 
A former United Kingdom Attorney-General, Lord Shawcross, accurately explained 
the effect of their Lordships decision in Gouriet when he noted 
The fact 1s that we have moved away from Dicey's age of reasoned 
democracy into the age of power. Responsibility to Parliament means rn 
practice responsibility to the party commanding the majority there, which is 
the party to which the Attorney-General must belong, (117) 
Gouriet illustrates the type of problem that can anse. The fact that the 
Attorney-General refused to give his reasons for withholding his consent increased 
the suspicions of those who considered that he may have been acting in the interests 
of his party rather than the public. 
Such suspicions were fueled further by the news media's portrayal of the case as a 
confrontation between the Labour government, represented by the Attorney-General, 
and a right wing pressure group represented by Mr Gouriet. 
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The essentially political nature of the Attorney-General's office 1s m itself 
sufficient reason for requiring that he not be the sole and final arbiter of what 
constitutes the "public interest". 
The question of whether the Attorney-General's exercise of his various powers, in 
regard to both relator actions and the conduct of criminal proceedings, is subject to 
judicial review is , therefore, of considerable importance. 
The Attorney-General and Judicial Review 
It has traditionally been considered that the Courts cannot examine a decision by 
the Attorney-General to grant or refuse his consent for a relator action to proceed. 
In London County Council v Attorney-General (118) the Earl of Halsbury L C held 
that it is for the Attorney-General alone to decide how to exercise his discretion 
with respect to relator actions. (119) If the Attorney-General made a mistake in the 
exercise of his discretion, His Lordship considered that 
it would not go to his jurisdiction; it would go, I think, to the conduct of 
his office, and it might be made, perhaps in Parliament, the subject of 
adverse comment; but what right has a Court of Law to intervene ? (120) 
The reasoning m London County Council was expressly upheld by the House of 
Lords in Gouriet, which, while not in the form of an application for judicial 
review of a decision of the Attorney-General, contains a number of clear statements 
to the effect that the exercise of Attorney-General's discretion was not subject to 
judicial review. Their Lordships opinions were based upon the distinction between 
public and private law, which Lord Wilberforce explained in the following terms; 
It can properly be said to be a fundamental principle of English law that 
private rights can be asserted by individuals, but that public rights can only 
be asserted by the Attorney-General as representing the public. In terms of 
constitutional law, the rights of the public are vested in the Crown, and the 
Attorney-General enforces them as an officer of the Crown. And just as the 
Attorney-General has in general no power to deal with the assertion of those 
rights, so in general no private person has the right of representing the public 
in the assertion of public rights. If he tries to do so his action can be struck 
out. (121) 
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As yet the New Zealand Court of Appeal has not been confronted with an 
application either to review the exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion to give 
consent to the bringing of a relator action or to allow the plaintiff to proceed 
without the Attorney-General's consent, as was asked of the court in Gouriet. Nor 
has the Court of Appeal had occasion to consider the Attorney-General's discretion 
to enter a stay of proceedings or institute criminal proceedings. 
When the Court of Appeal does hear a case on this point, it is to be hoped that the 
court will recognise that there are different categories of decision made by the 
Attorney-General and that those categories are differentiated by the nature and 
source of the authority given to the Attorney-General. 
In relation to the criminal law, the Attorney-General's discretion is governed by 
statute, while the discretion to grant consent for a relator action to proceed remams 
part of the prerogative. It may be that "authorities as to the reviewability of one 
category may not necessarily be applicable to another". (122) 
An applicant seeking judicial review of a decision of the Attorney-General founded 
on the royal prerogative would, it seems, have more difficulty than one seeking 
review under the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 on the basis of the 
Attorney-General's decision made pursuant to a statutory power. 
The House of Lords, now differently constituted from that which was prepared to 
accept that the royal prerogative could be subjected to judicial review in CCSU v 
Minister for Civil Service (123), has turned away from what has been termed the 
"expansionist" approach. (124) The current wisdom of their Lordships is to leave 
discretionary decisions to the appropriate administrative tribunal or decision maker, 
with recourse to judicial review only in exceptional circumstances. (125) 
Whether the New Zealand Court of Appeal will follow suit remams to be seen. There 
have, however, been a number of relevant cases before the High Court in recent 
years that shed some light on the approach likely to be taken by the Court of 
Appeal in respect to the powers of the Attorney-General. 
In Dae mar v Gilliard (126) McMullin J had to consider four applications for judicial 
review of the decision of the Solicitor-General to enter a stay of prosecutions in 
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respect of several informations laid by the applicant. McMullin J decided that the 
decision to enter a stay of proceedings was not the exercise or purported exercise of 
a statutory power and declined the applications. (127) His Honour cited a number of 
authorities, including Gouriet, in support of the proposition that the powers and 
duties of the Attorney-General are not subject to review. 
The persuasive value of Daemar was subsequently doubted by O'Regan J m Tindal v 
Muldoon and Others (128) who considered that McMullin J had not fully appreciated 
the effect of the Judicature Amendment Act 1977. Notwithstanding that point, 
O'Regan J agreed with McMullin's J view that the plaintiff would not be entitled to 
relief tn proceedings for mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, declaration or 
injunction, nor did he find it necessary to consider whether the decision to stay 
proceedings constituted the exercise of a statutory power. (129) His Honour was 
content to rely on the established principle that if the Attorney-General's actions are 
to be questioned, it must be in Parliament and not the courts. (130) 
In the writer's submission, such a principle, while supported by authority, 1s 
outdated and should be dispensed with. Given that decisions of other Ministers of 
the Crown may be subject to judicial review, (131) there is no logical reason why 
actions of the Attorney-General should not be subject to the same scrutiny. 
Regretfully that can not be said to be the position at New Zealand law. 
In Slipper Island Resort Ltd v Minister of Works and Development (132) it was held 
that a prerogative power is not a statutory power and therefore cannot be brought 
under the terms of the Judicature Amendment Act. This extended to the actions or 
conduct of the Attorney-General in providing advice to the Governor-General, 
where the Governor- General was exercising a prerogative power. 
This dicta was approved recently by Greig J m Burt v Governor-General (133) 
where the plaintiff sought judicial review of the Governor-General's decision to 
decline to exercise the prerogative of mercy (134). Greig J was prepared to accept 
that it could be argued that when the Executive Council advises the 
Governor-General on the action he should take pursuant to a statutory authority, 
that constitutes an exercise of statutory power and is therefore reviewable. 
As the sole reference in this case was to the Attorney-General, not the Executive 
Council, Greig J was not prepared to consider that argument, and turned down the 
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application on the basis that the prerogative of mercy " ... is a unique, extra-legal, 
extra - judicial and extraordinary power that cannot be subject to court revision". 
(135) None of those points could be used, however, to justify a refusal to review the 
exercise of the Attorney-General's discretion to prosecute, which is statutory based. 
(136) But there would appear little likelihood of movement away from the principles 
outlined by the House of Lords in Gouriet, unless a particularly meritorious case 
reaches the Court of Appeal and persuades that court to acknowledge the possibility 
of review, even if only in exceptional circumstances. 
The current Attorney-General, Mr Palmer, is "content to leave to the courts" (137) 
the question of whether judicial review should be extended over decisions of the 
Attorney-General, which rules out any possibility of further amendment to the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 to specifically allow review of any or all of the 
Attorney- General's powers. 
There is, however, another option, at least in regard to relator actions. The need for 
judicial review would be obviated to a considerable extent if individual members 
were able to bring an action without the Attorney-General's consent, upon 
application to the court. 
The writer favours this indirect method of reviewing the Attorney-General 's 
discretion in respect of relater actions was proposed by Lord Denning in Gouriet, 
which is discussed in more detail below. 
The Office of Attorney-General: Options for Reform 
While there are any number of possibilities, reform options fall into one of two 
categories; those that alter the functions and powers of the Attorney- General and 
those that go to the actual nature of the office itself. 
Reform of the Functions and Powers of the Attorney-General 
The traditional role of the Attorney-General as the guardian of the public interest 
in respect to relater actions has come increasingly under attack in recent years, with 
Gouriet being the outstanding example. 
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In the writer's submission it is inappropriate to entrust the protection of the public 
interest to any one official, even the Attorney-General who by definition 1s a 
partisan member of the government of the day. If the Attorney-General is to have a 
role in relator actions, it should not be that of final arbiter as to whether or not an 
action may proceed. 
This view received judicial approval for the first time in McWhirter v Independent 
Broadcasting Authority (138) through the person of Lord Denning who in an obiter 
comment expressed the opinion that an individual member of the public could apply 
for an injunction 
... m the last resort, if the Attorney-General refuses leave in a proper case, or 
improperly or unreasonably delays in giving leave, or his machinery works 
too slowly. (139) 
Some years later, Lord Denning in Gouriet went so far as to say that any member of 
the public who is adversely affected should, upon application to the court, be able 
to proceed without the Attorney-General's consent. (140) 
The Law Commission of British Columbia in its 1981 Report "Civil Litigation in the 
Public Interest" (141) considered Gouriet and rejected the House of Lords judgment 
with respect to the all powerful role of the Attorney-General. The Commission 
concluded, inter alia, that any member of the public should have the right to bring 
proceedings in respect of an alleged violation a public right protected by statute. 
(142) Under the Commission's recommendation, if the Attorney-General refused to 
grant consent the individual applicant could bring proceedings in his own name 
upon obtaining the consent of the court. That consent would be given unless the 
court held that there was not a justiciable issue to be tried. (143) The 
Attorney-General would, however, have the right at all times to intervene in the 
proceedings or to be joined as a party of record, and therefore would still have the 
opportunity to present to the court issues that might not otherwise be drawn to its 
attention. (144) 
This recommendation illustrates the recognition by the Commission that the 
Attorney-General has a continuing role in public interest litigation, although it was 
not prepared to accept that the conduct of relator actions should remain exclusively 
the prerogative of the Attorney-General. 
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The Commission was of the view that its recommendation would ensure that 
his decision not to participate will not give nse to any suggestion that this 
decision has prevented any otherwise meritorious case being brought before 
the courts .(145) 
The Commission's preparedness to allow a relaxation of the rules of locus standi to 
the point that any member of the public could bring a relator action upon 
application to the court goes further than Lawton LJ went in Gouriet. While Lawton 
LJ was also not of a mind to accept that the Attorney-General is the sole arbiter of 
what the public interest is in civil litigation, he considered that it will "only be 10 
the rare case ... that the court will allow a plaintiff to proceed". (146) 
Lawton LJ envisaged that the courts would deny relief to 
busy bodies, mischief makers and anybody who was not likely to be 
personally affected by the threatened criminal acts.(147) 
The court would not have discretion to refuse relief to applicants on those grounds 
if the British Columbian recommendation was adopted. Permission to proceed 
independently of the Attorney-General's consent could only be withheld if the 
matter at issue was not justiciable. (148) 
In the writer's submission the different approaches taken by Lawton LJ on one hand 
and the Law Commission on the other are both unsatisfactory. The ideal solution 
would be somewhere between the two options, so that members of the public with a 
genuine interest in the matter could seek relief through civil litigation with the 
courts retaining discretion to refuse consent to potential plaintiffs where the 
application is vexatious or in bad faith. There should be no requirement, however, 
that the applicant be directly affected by the threatened breach of the criminal law. 
Everyone in society has an interest in seeing that the rule of law is upheld, whether 
they are affected directly by its breach rn a particular instance or not, and 
accordingly should be able to seek its enforcement. 
The policy arguments adopted by the Law Commission of British Columbia also 
apply to the role of the Attorney-General in the administration of the criminal law. 
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Their applicability is, rn fact, of more importance given that parties to proceedings 
at criminal law may stand to lose their liberty if convicted and certainly their good 
reputation. 
In 1979 the House of Commons 10 Great Britain 
Prosecutions Bill, which sought to transfer from 
had before it the Consent to 
the Attorney-General to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions discretion to consent to prosecutions contained rn 
other enactments. (149) The Bill failed to get past a first reading and the 
Attorney-General in Great Britain remains ultimately responsible for the exercise of 
discretionary powers to prosecute prescribed by statute. 
The British Parliament has, however, moved in at least one instance to remove from 
the Attorney-General absolute discretion with respect to consenting to prosecutions. 
s7 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 provides that proceedings may be instituted 
only on the consent of the Attorney-General or on the motion of the court. By 
providing individual members of the public with the residual right to act even 
where the Attorney-General has refused to do so, Parliament implicitly accepted the 
principle behind the innovation of the Court of Appeal in Gouriet. That this step 
was taken in an Act codifying the common law of contempt reflects the policy 
nature of that area of the law. 
As Davison CJ noted 10 Solicitor-General v Broadcasting Corporation of New 
Zealand 
The law of contempt is founded entirely on public policy and public policy 
reqmres the balancing of interests that may conflict. In the realm of 
contempt there is, on the one hand, the right of an accused person to a fair 
trial by the Courts and not to have that trial prejudiced from outside sources. 
On the other hand, the public's right to know, freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the Press should not be limited to any greater extent than is 
necessary. (150) 
It is therefore not appropriate to rely only upon the Attorney-General, an elected 
politician, to determine when proceedings should be brought. The court should also 
have a role to play, upon application from a member of the public. Had a similar 
statutory provision existed in New Zealand, the Prime Minister, Mr Lange, may well 
have faced privately laid proceedings for criminal contempt of court for his 
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comment that Peter Fulcher, against whom serious drug charges were pending, was 
"a criminal who was the top heavy wholesale drug dealer in New Zealand. He 1s a 
thug". (151) 
Fulcher himself complained that 
As a direct result of our Prime Minister's outbursts I now find it an 
impossibility to find a jury in New Zealand that has not been swayed by this 
tirade ... (152) 
The decision of the law officers not to commence proceedings ensured that a 
prosecution could not be made. As previously discussed, (153) the Opposition's 
allegation that the Attorney-General did not bring proceedings against his Prime 
Minister because of partisan political considerations, while charges were 
subsequently laid against Mr Banks for comments of a similar nature, would have 
the effect of undermining the integrity of the office of Attorney-General and 
therefore that of the legal system as a whole. 
Had provision existed for a private prosecution to be brought with the consent of 
the court, the Attorney-General's role would have been less pivotal and accordingly 
less open to attack. 
Problems such as those illustrated by the Banks case would not occur at all if the 
Attorney-General did not have ultimate responsibility for the administration of the 
criminal law in particular cases. If the Solicitor-General, a senior civil servant, was 
to have the final responsibility for entering and withdrawing prosecutions rn 
constitutional theory as well as in the usual course of things, public confidence tn 
the legal system would be strengthened in the knowledge that the law was not open 
to abuse on improper political grounds. The Attorney-General would continue to 
maintain a supervisory role over the legal system, particularly as regards the 
appointment of the judiciary and the operation of the courts. 
Reform of the Structure of the Office of Attorney-General 
There are three options for reform of the structure of the office of 
Attorney-General that warrant consideration in the New Zealand context. 
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They are: 
1) The removal of the Attorney-General from the political process by 
providing that the office is to be held only by non- members of Parliament. 
2) The continuance of the Attorney-General as an elected member of the 
government of the day, but with the removal of membership of Cabinet from 
that office. 
3) The abolition of the office of Attorney-General, to be replaced by an 
Advocate-General with responsibility to protect the public interest in civil 
litigation. 
A Non-Political Attorney-General ? 
New Zealand is one of few Commonwealth nations that have, at some point 10 time, 
selected Attorney's-General from outside the ranks of politicians. In 1866 the 
Attorney-General's Act was passed providing that the office of Attorney-General 
was to be a non-political appointment with the same status and independence of a 
member of the judiciary. While this experiment lasted just ten years, it nevertheless 
is a precedent that could again be considered. 
Arguably the rationale for having an Attorney-General not directly involved 10 
party politics is even more compelling now then it was in 1866, when strong party 
discipline and coherence was not the feature of politics that it is today. Taking the 
office of Attorney-General outside the political arena would give the enforcement 
of the rights of the public and the rule of law the appearance, as well as the reality, 
of detachment from partisan political considerations. 
A number of Commonwealth countries have already adopted this reform, including 
Malaysia, India, Kenya, Singapore and Malta. (154) 
Under such a reform, the Attorney-General could be accountable to Parliament 
through the Minister of Justice, who already holds responsibility for a wide range of 
functions related to the operation of the legal system, such as law reform, the prison 
system, and the commercial law. It is implicit in this reform option that particular 
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exercises of the Attorney-General's discretion to institute or withdraw criminal 
proceedings would not be subject to the scrutiny of Parliament. 
The Attorney-General Outside Cabinet ? 
The United Kingdom practice of not according the Attorney-General membership of 
Cabinet has not been adopted 10 New Zealand, with the Attorney-General 
continuing to play a full part in Cabinet decision making. There have been, 
however, suggestions from academic commentators that New Zealand would benefit 
by removing Cabinet rank from the holder of the office of Attorney-General. (155) 
Professor Brookfield, noting that as a member of Cabinet the Attorney-General 
shares in the collective responsibility for decisions of that body, considered that 
the easily made change of excluding the Attorney-General from the Cabinet, 
so that he ceases to be so closely involved in Cabinet policies and decisions, 
would be a clear, if modest, benefit to his office and the administration of 
j ustice ... (156) 
Recent holders of the office 10 New Zealand, 
that the Attorney-General should remarn 
Attorney-General in the National government 
opinion that 
however, are unammous rn the view 
within Cabinet. Hon Jim McLay, 
between 1978 and 1984, was of the 
the bi unt truth of the matter is that it is essential that there be, seated at the 
Cabinet table, a person with legal knowledge who can alert his/her colleagues 
as to any legal issues that might arise from a decision that they are 
contemplating. Such a person must have full Cabinet status if he/she is to 
argue such a view, rather than simply present advice as an outsider. (157) 
The current Attorney-General, Mr Palmer, cites another advantage of having the 
Attorney-General in Cabinet; namely 
he can explain the effect judicial decisions to his colleagues. He can advise 
on practical implications of those decisions. He can ensure that the Cabinet 
respects the independence of the judiciary. (158) 
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An Advocate-General for New Zealand ? 
The most radical reform that has been publicly suggested 1s the abolition of the 
office of Attorney-General combined with the appointment of an Advocate-General, 
a permanent non-political law officer with the status of a High Court judge. 
While this idea was raised most recently by Jack Hodder at the 1987 New Zealand 
Law Conference,(159) its genesis was an article published rn 1985 by Professor John 
Griffith. (160) 
Professor Griffith considered the approach of the House of Lords in a number of 
cases where the courts were asked to review government actions, and concluded that 
the public was not well served by the judicial process. One particular fault of the 
adversary nature of litigation is that the courts do not actively seek the truth 
through its own research into the particular matters at issue. 
To address this problem Professor Griffith recommended 
the appointment of a public officer whose responsibility it would be to act as 
an Advocate-General, to present such evidence as he considered necessary rn 
the public interest, and generally to draw the attention of the court to place 
those matters affecting the public interest which he considered the court 
should take into account. (161) 
The principal motivation behind this recommendation was to provide a means 
whereby judges, as they are required to make policy decisions in the public interest, 
could equip themselves with all the relevant information. Mr Hodder argues that the 
logical conclusion of accepting the case for an Advocate-General is the abolition of 
the office of Attorney-General, (162) with the Advocate-General also taking over the 
civil law functions of the Attorney-General, such as deciding upon applications for 
relator actions. The Attorney-General's criminal law functions could be transferred 
either to the Solicitor-General, or to the Advocate-General if it 1s considered 
preferable that both functions be combined. 
Conclusions 
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The position of Attorney-General m New Zealand is important in terms of the high 
standing of the office politically, but more particularly because of the all powerful 
role enjoyed by the holder of the office under both statute and the prerogative. The 
exercise of these powers is not without controversy, in the main because of the 
political hat also worn by the Attorney-General and the resulting cynicism that may 
anse as to his motives when citing the "public interest" as justification for his 
actions. 
Is it appropriate, therefore, to remove the Attorney-General from the political 
process altogether ? 
The writer 1s unconvinced that such a radical reform 1s either desirable or 
necessary. 
particular 
distinction 
Where an 
The Attorney-General's political role can cause problems because of the 
functions that have traditionally fallen to the office, although a 
does need to be drawn between the different types of prosecution powers. 
offence 1s created rn a statute which relates to New Zealand's 
international law obligations, for example, the government clearly has a legitimate 
right to intervene in the process. The conduct of foreign affairs is, after all, a 
fundamental function of any government. But there is no reason to leave the 
exercise of the discretion in such cases to the Attorney-General alone. Such decisions 
should be made by Cabinet, upon the advice of the Attorney-General. 
While also of a highly policy nature, the exercise of a prosecutorial discretion rn 
statutes that seek to limit free speech, for example the Race Relations Act 1971, is 
not appropriate for the sole determination of either the Attorney-General or Cabinet 
as a whole. In a democratic society differences of opinion and philosophy are 
inevitable and even healthy, however, there is substantial agreement that there must 
be some limits on the freedom of speech on the grounds of public policy. There may 
be, for example, limits designed to promote racial harmony and tolerance, or the 
rights of women by limiting the availability of pornography. 
The limits placed upon freedom of expression determined by statute bring with them 
inevitable controversy and debate. That is a legitimate part of the political process. 
If members of the public consider the government's attempt to draw the line 
between the competing interests of free speech and, for example, the need to 
promote better race relations to be wrong, they can exercise a protest by voting 
against the government at the subsequent election. 
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While it lS the government's role to determine policy on such matters, it is not 
appropriate for its chief legal advisor to determine its applicability to criminal 
proceedings lil particular cases. The writer lS attracted to the idea of the 
appointment of an Advocate-General, whose responsibility would be to determine 
the "public interest" and exercise the discretion to prosecute accordingly. The case 
for an Advocate-General to exercise the civil law functions of the Attorney- General 
is also compelling, particularly the discretion to determine whether consent will be 
granted for a relator action to proceed. 
The Advocate-General should not simply be an appendage of either the Department 
of Justice or the Crown Law Office. The position should be created by separate Act 
of Parliament, the most relevant precedent being the Ombudesmen Act 1975. The 
appointment would be made on a bi-partisan basis, and accountability to Parliament 
would be through the Speaker by way of annual reports. 
In the writer's submission, the creation of an Advocate-General to exercise the 
discretionary powers currently the responsibility of the Attorney-General, both civil 
and criminal m nature, would obviate the need for further reform. The 
Attorney-General should continue to remain a political appointment, and as the 
government's chief legal advisor it is appropriate that he/she remain a member of 
Cabinet. It is interesting to note that the two countries where the Attorney-General 
does not hold Cabinet rank, the United Kingdom and Australia, have still 
encountered their share of controversy as illustrated by the Campbell and Ellicott 
cases. 
This experience indicates that it is the attitudes of the Attorney-General and his 
political colleagues, rather than the actual structure within which they operate, that 
determine whether abuses will occur. 
To use the words of Professor Edwards 
... m the final analysis it 1s the strength of character, personal integrity and 
depth of commitment to the principles of independence and impartial 
representation of the public interest, on the part of the holders of the office 
of Attorney-General which is of supreme importance. Such qualities are by 
- 45 -
no means associated with either the political or non-political nature of the office of 
Attorney-General (163) 
New Zealand has been well served by those who have held the office of 
Attorney-General, with few blemishes against a record of decision making otherwise 
without the influence of improper political considerations being present. Those few 
occas10ns on which the Attorney-General's political impartiality have been 
questioned, combined with overseas experience, show that there can be no room for 
complacency. But it would seem both more desirable and realistic to remove the core 
of any difficulties that do arise, the discretionary powers that give the 
Attorney-General ultimate control over criminal proceedings and certain civil 
proceedings, rather than expect a political officer to somehow shut out of his mind 
all those considerations that condition the daily existence of all politicians. 
The appointment of an Advocate-General would achieve this, particularly if there 
was also recognition that courts do make decisions with a high policy content, and 
therefore could responsibly exercise a discretion to determine whether a relator 
action should proceed in the absence of the Advocate-General's consent. The present 
government in proposing the introduction of a Bill of Rights, (164) implicitly 
recognised the court's ability to involve itself in policy oriented issues, even to the 
extent of striking down legislation. 
Whether it is appropriate to involve the courts in the political process to such an 
extent is arguable, but it is clear that in so far as relator actions are concerned the 
courts would capably any discretion provided to them. It now falls to the legislature 
I 
to recognise the shortcomings inherent in the office of Attorney-General and act 
accordingly. 
It is to be hoped that action is taken before New Zealand encounters an abuse of the 
office to rival Campbell and Ellicott, which are still of sufficiently recent memory 
to illustrate vividly what can go wrong when the integrity of the legal system is 
place at risk by either the Attorney-General or his political colleagues. 
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